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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
George Allen Kapelle appeals from his convictions for manufacturing 
marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm. Specifically, Kapelle challenges 
the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The district court issued the following statement of facts: 
On July 13, 2011, Detectives Mark Strangio and Marty Ryan 
were searching for an individual named Steven Gervasi, who was 
wanted on a felony arrest warrant. It was rumored that Gervasi 
was hiding out with friends and possibly staying in an abandoned 
trailer on Artisan Way, in Bonner County. The Detectives went to 
Artisan Way and found a single wide trailer that appeared 
abandoned. The Detectives did not observe a gate blocking the 
entrance to the property, or any "No Trespassing" signs posted on 
the property, even though the Defendant asserts that "No 
trespassing" sign(s) were posted on the property and that a gate 
exists. 
The Detectives parked in the driveway and approached the 
trailer on foot. Detective Strangio and Detective Ryan stayed on 
the path of the driveway. As the Detectives neared the front porch 
of the trailer, the Defendant stepped out of the front door. The 
Detectives told the Defendant they were looking for Mr. Gervasi 
and asked if they were at the right location. The Defendant said 
that Mr. Gervasi was not there. Detective Ryan asked the 
Defendant if the officers could do a quick walk through of the 
residence to look for Mr. Gervasi. According to the Detectives, 
Kapelle said "okay," and then turned and walked back into his 
residence, leaving the front door open. The Defendant denied 
giving detectives consent to come inside and look for Mr. Gervasi; 
he contends that he walked back into the trailer, and the Detectives 
followed him. 
Once inside the residence, the Detectives were 
overwhelmed by the odor of fresh marijuana. The Detectives 
noticed that the Defendant's composure appeared nervous. 
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Detective Strangio asked if he could continue a walk-thru of the rest 
of the property. The Defendant looked down the hallway, waited a 
moment, and then replied, "I would rather you not walk back there." 
At that time, Detective Ryan asked, "so how many plants do you 
have brother, cause the odor is too much, it's killing us." The 
Defendant then told the officers that he had only a few plants, but if 
the officers would let him, he would just destroy the plants and 
promise to never grow marijuana again. 
Detective Ryan retrieved a digital recorder and a written 
consent form from the Detectives' vehicle. Upon returning, 
Detective Ryan activated the recorder and created a recording of 
the remainder of the Detectives' contact with the Defendant. 
Detective Ryan Mirandized the Defendant, who then agreed to 
speak to the officers. Detective Ryan provided the Defendant with 
a consent form, explaining that he did not have to consent to a 
search of his home, but if he did not then the Detectives would 
acquire a search warrant. The Defendant asserts that he asked to 
call an attorney at that time, but the Detective refused to allow the 
contact. The Defendant then signed the consent form, and the 
Detectives conducted a search that resulted in evidence of an 
extensive marijuana grow operation. 
During the search, the Detectives also asked the Defendant 
if he had any weapons in the house, and the Defendant pointed out 
a large caliber rifle that was sitting behind the front door. The 
following day, it was discovered that the Defendant was convicted 
of Felony Burglary in the State of California in 1997. 
(R., pp.158-160.) 
The state charged Kapelle with trafficking in marijuana and unlawful 
possession of a firearm. (R., pp.49-50.) Kapelle filed a motion to suppress, 
asserting his rights were violated by the officers' warrantless entry onto his 
property as well as their warrantless entry into his home. (R., pp.60-61.) Kapelle 
further asserted his right against self-incrimination was violated when he made 
statements to the detectives and evidence was seized "after his request to 
contact an attorney [was] communicated to law enforcement while inside his 
home." (R., p.62.) 
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Following a two-part hearing on the motion where the state presented the 
testimony of Detectives Ryan and Strangio and Kapelle testified on his own 
behalf as well as calling his mother and two neighbors to the stand (see 
generally, Tr., pp. 7-192), the court issued a written memorandum opinion and 
order denying Kapelle's motion to suppress (R., pp.158-173). 
Kapelle entered a conditional plea of guilty to an amended charge of 
manufacturing marijuana and unlawful possession of a firearm, reserving his right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. (Tr., p.195, L.14 - p.196, L.12, 
p.204, L.7 - p.205, L.2.) The court placed Kapelle on a three-year period of 
supervised probation with concurrent underlying five-year unified sentences with 
the first two years fixed. (Tr., p.218, Ls.2-9; R., pp.189-196.) Following an order 
reinstating Kapelle's appeal upon his motion, Kapelle filed a timely amended 
notice of appeal. (2/27 /13 Order; 3/11/13 Amended NOA) 
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ISSUE 
Kapelle's brief does not contain a statement of issues on appeal as 
required by I.AR. 35(a)(4). The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Kapelle failed to show that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A Introduction 
The district court concluded law enforcement lawfully entered the curtilage 
surrounding Kapelle's home and received valid consent from Kapelle to search 
his home. (R., pp.160-168.) 
Kapelle argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion 
to suppress because there was no "legitimate societal purpose" for law 
enforcement to enter Kapelle's property nor did they obtain valid consent from 
Kapelle to enter or search his home. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-12.) Kapelle's 
arguments are without merit. As such, Kapelle has failed to establish the district 
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485-
6, 211 P.3d 91, 94-95 (2009); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d 306, 309 
(2004). Whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact, the 
determination of which is reviewed on appeal for clear error. State v. Reynolds, 
146 Idaho 466, 472, 197 P.3d 327, 333 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Stewart, 145 
Idaho 641, 648, 181 P.3d 1249, 1256 (Ct. App. 2008). At a suppression hearing, 
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the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh 
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. 
Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). "Findings will 
not be deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in 
the record." Stewart, 145 Idaho at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256 (quoting State v. 
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 98, 137 P.3d 481,485 (Ct. App. 2006)). 
C. Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding That 
Law Enforcement Was Legally Justified In Entering His Property 
Kapelle argues on appeal that the "tip" Detective Ryan received from an 
"individual [who] had given [him] information in the past that had led to the 
apprehension of a felon suspect in recent history" (Tr., P.12, Ls.5-8) that Gervasi 
could be found in "an abandoned trailer on Artisan Way" (Tr., p.17, Ls.9-10) was 
not reliable and Kapelle was deprived of testing its reliability in court. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) Although the district court did not address the 
reliability of the information provided to the detectives in denying Kapelle's 
motion to suppress, it had previously denied Kapelle's motion to compel 
information about the informant as being without merit. (R., pp.96-100.) 
Armed with the information provided by Detective Ryan's source, which 
provided the detectives with reasonable suspicion to believe they would locate 
Gervasi in the location described, the detectives came upon Kapelle's property 
and, noting the dilapidated appearance of the trailer and taking into consideration 
their belief the trailer was located in the area described by Detective Ryan's 
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source, they entered the property and eventually made contact with Kapelle. 
(Tr., p.15, L.3 - p.24, L.19.) As it turned out, the location they ended up at in the 
rural area of Artisan Way was not in fact the location described by Ryan's source, 
although the detectives did not realize this at the time. (Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.17, 
L.14.) The district court correctly determined, in denying Kapelle's motion to 
compel, that it was "undisputed that officers made a mistake in believing that 
Defendant's trailer was abandoned" and "[w]hether or not the officers acted 
reasonably when approaching Defendant's trailer (that is, whether or not, for 
example, the trailer looked abandoned) [was] a question for the officers, and not 
the informant." (R., p.98.) 
Kapelle argues law enforcement is not allowed to approach an individual's 
home by means of a driveway without a warrant because "it is within the home's 
curtilage." (Appellant's brief, p.6.) Such claim is without merit. Idaho precedent 
is clear that it is constitutionally permissible to enter onto the curtilage of one's 
property. As explained in State v. Clark, 124 Idaho 308, 313, 859 P.2d 344, 349 
(Ct. App 1993) (citations omitted): 
There is an implied invitation for the public to use access routes to 
the house, such as parking areas, driveways, sidewalks, or 
pathways to the entry, and there can be no reasonable expectation 
of privacy as to observations which can be made from such areas. 
Like other citizens, police with legitimate business are entitled to 
enter areas of the cartilage that are impliedly open to public use. 
See State v. Prewitt, 136 Idaho 547, 551, 38 P.3d 126, 130 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that objects viewed while officer approached home using driveway did 
not constitute unlawful search). 
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Kapelle further argues that it was clear from the set-up of Kapelle and his 
neighbors' properties, including "no trespassing" signs, that "uninvited visitors 
[were] neither encouraged nor expected" and this required law enforcement 
obtain a warrant prior to accessing his property through the driveway. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.) Kapelle concedes "signs alone do not create a 
legitimate expectation of privacy," but maintains that "no trespassing" signs 
combined with "a primitive road and secluded location" would give "a respective 
citizen" the belief that he did not have consent to enter. (Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The detectives, however, both testified they did not see a "no trespassing" sign 
on the date in question. (See, Tr., p.18, L.19- p.19, L.3, p.72, L.16 - p.73, L.3, 
p.86, Ls.15-19, p.105, L.18 - p.106, L.11.) As Detective Ryan testified, there 
was nothing that led him to believe someone "would be disallowed from walking 
up and knocking on the door and making contact." (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-3.) 
Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of the officers more 
credible than that of Kapelle and his neighbors on the issue of whether there 
were indicia of measures taken to prevent access to Kapelle's home on the date 
in question. The district court was in the best position to determine the credibility 
of these witnesses and its determination is supported by the record in this matter. 
The court further found that even had there been a sign posted, 
the Detectives stayed on the driveway and path to the front door of 
the trailer, did not search the area between the entry and the 
Defendant's trailer for any violations of the law, and provided 
sufficient proof that they were there for a legitimate societal 
purpose: inquiring into the location of a wanted felon. Therefore, 
even if there was a "no trespassing" sign posted, the entry in to the 
curtilage is lawful. 
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(R., pp.165-166.) 
Kapelle has failed to establish otherwise and has therefore failed to show 
any error in the district court's contrary conclusion on this point. 
D. Kapelle Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Finding 
Kapelle's Consent To Search Was Valid 
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 
695,978 P.2d 881,883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a 
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
kl at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 225-226 (1973)). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of 
duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 228. A 
voluntary decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker." kl at 225. An individual's consent is 
involuntary, on the other hand, "if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 
P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 225). The mere 
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of 
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law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion. See United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 
643, 646, 167 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2006), a trial court's factual determination 
regarding consent is entitled to deference: 
The trial court is the proper forum for the "careful sifting of 
the unique facts and circumstances of each case" necessary in 
determining voluntariness. Even though the evidence may be 
equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court's finding of fact 
is based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
record, it will not be disturbed on appeal. In short, whether a 
consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, and our 
standard of review requires that we accept a trial court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings will not be 
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Applying these principles to the evidence before it, the district court 
correctly concluded that Kapelle voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into 
his house and to their search of the trailer. (R., pp.166-168.) 
Upon making contact with Kapelle standing on the porch of the previously 
believed to be abandoned trailer, Detective Ryan asked Kapelle if Gervasi was in 
the trailer. (Tr., p.24, L.8 - p.26, L.11.) The detective asked to come inside to 
make sure Gervasi was not hiding in there and Kapelle "stared at [them] for a 
second, said okay and turned and just walked into the house leaving the door 
open." (Tr., p.26, Ls.16-18.) Detective Strangio was unable to remember if 
Kapelle gave an audible answer in the affirmative to Detective Ryan's question to 
enter Kapelle's trailer, but testified Kapelle at least "shook his head in the 
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affirmative" and the detectives entered only "after he gave us the okay to do so." 
(Tr., p.103, L.22.) Although Kapelle argues on appeal that consent was not given 
to enter the home as "it is unlikely that Kapelle would consent to officers entering 
his home when it contained an overwhelming odor of marijuana and 39 
marijuana plants" (Appellant's brief, p.9), the court specifically found that the 
officers' version of events was more credible, and that there was nothing to 
indicate that this consent was coerced. (R., p.167.) There were only two officers 
present at Kapelle's residence and they were dressed in plain clothes. (Tr., p.18, 
Ls.16-18.) Although the officers had their weapons drawn in anticipation of being 
confronted by a wanted felon, their guns remained at their sides and were not 
pointed at Kapelle. (Tr., p.29, Ls.3-17.) 
Although Kapelle asserts on appeal that, if he did consent to entry into his 
trailer, it was not voluntary, all he points to as evidence of coercion is Kapelle's 
own demeanor as "wide eyed, scared, nervous and confused" in addition to the 
"officer's nervous and excited demeanor." (Appellant's brief, p.9 (citation 
omitted).) The allegations of a nervous and excited demeanor by the officers 
present is not supported by the record (see, Tr., p.94, Ls.3-4 (testimony by 
Detective Strangio that neither officer yelled at Kapelle at any point)) nor does 
Kapelle's anxiety render his consent involuntary. 
Once inside the trailer pursuant to Kapelle's voluntary consent, the officers 
immediately smelled the odor of growing marijuana. (Tr., p.26, L.19 - p.27, L.13, 
35, Ls.2-17, p.94, L.13 - p.95, L.19.) Thereafter Kapelle signed a consent to 
search form allowing the officers access to the trailer. (R., p.130.) Kapelle 
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claims on appeal his signing of the consent form was coerced in that the officers 
"made it clear to Kapelle that if he did not consent to a full search, they would 
'lock down' the premises and that Kapelle would be arrested." (Appellant's brief, 
p.11.) Not only did the detectives not threaten to arrest Kapelle, they never 
placed him in handcuffs (Tr., p.37, Ls.21-23) and Detective Ryan advised Kapelle 
that "when this [was] all done," they would just issue Kapelle a summons for any 
charge (Tr., p.40, Ls.3-4). 
Kapelle contends he only consented to a search because of a threat by 
the officers to get a search warrant. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-11.) However, 
where, as here, officers have probable cause to obtain a search warrant, it is not 
coercive to make such a statement to the homeowner. As the district court 
correctly held, "the fact that the Detectives would obtain a warrant if the 
Defendant refused the consent to search does not in and of itself render the 
Defendant's consent involuntary." (R., p.168.) See State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 
840, 848, 186 P.3d 696, 740 (Ct. App. 2008) ("consent to search not rendered 
involuntary by the officer's truthful explanation that he could obtain a warrant." 
( citation omitted).) 
Ultimately, the district court found the testimony of the officers more 
credible than that of Kapelle. The district court was in the best position to 
determine the credibility of these witnesses and since its determination is 
supported by the record in this matter, it should stand. The district court correctly 
concluded Kapelle "consented to the entry and the search of his residence, and 
that the consent was voluntary based on the evidence presented." (R., p.168.) 
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Kapelle has failed to show that the district court's determination that 
Kapelle consented to the entry of law enforcement into his home and the search 
of his home was clearly erroneous and therefore has failed to establish the 
district court erred in denying Kapelle's motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying Kapelle's motion to suppress. 
Dated this 26th day of November 201 . 
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